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This paper provides trong evidence challenging the self-interest assump- 
tion that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary think- 
ing. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to 
voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We 
call this behavioral propensity "strong reciprocity" and show empirically 
that it can lead to almost universal cooperation i  circumstances in which 
purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of co- 
operation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those 
who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Pris- 
oner's Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests hat strong reci- 
procity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, 
for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be 
rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of 
human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, in- 
direct reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selec- 
tion theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity. 
KEY WORDS" Evolution; Game theory; Human cooperation; Punish- 
ment; Social norms; Strong reciprocity 
A key fact about human society is the ubiquity of material incentives to 
cheat on implicit or explicit cooperative agreements.  In any kind of social 
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or economic exchange situation between two or more individuals in which 
not all aspects of the exchange are determined by enforceable contracts, 
there are material incentives to cheat. Even in modern human societies 
with a large cooperative infrastructure in the form of laws, impartial 
courts, and the police, the material incentive to cheat on cooperative agree- 
ments is probably the rule rather than the exception. This is so because, in 
general, not all obligations that arise in the various contingencies of ex- 
change situations can be unambiguously formulated and subjected to a 
binding contract. 1 Therefore, by reneging on the implicit or unenforceable 
obligations aparty can always improve its material payoff relative to a sit- 
uation in which it meets its obligations. Of course, in premodern societies 
lacking a cooperative infrastructure, cheating incentives are even more 
prevalent. It is probably true that in more than 90% of human history no 
cooperative infrastructure existed. 
Another key fact about human society is that, despite these incentives 
to cheat, many "nonbinding" agreements among non-kin occur and are 
kept. Since cooperation regularly also takes place among non-kin, geneti- 
cal kinship theory (Hamilton 1964) cannot readily account for this fact. 
One possibility to account for the manifest cooperation among non-kin is 
to recognize that many social interactions take place repeatedly. Evolu- 
tionary theorists, for example, have shown that natural selection can favor 
reciprocally cooperative behavior in bilateral interactions when the 
chances to interact repeatedly with the same individual in the future are 
sufficiently high (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Trivets 1971). Since cheat- 
ing (i.e., not reciprocating a cooperative act) can be deterred by the 
withdrawal of future cooperation, it is in the long-run interest of organ- 
isms not to cheat. Therefore, in bilateral repeated interactions reciprocal 
cooperation can be an evolutionarily stable outcome. In a similar spirit, 
game theorists have shown that, when the chances for repeated inter- 
actions are sufficiently high, rational egoists (i.e., rational actors who 
are solely interested in their own material well-being) can establish an 
equilibrium with full cooperation despite the existence of short-run 
cheating incentives (Friedman 1971; Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). Not 
only does cheating have short-run benefits, it may also have long- 
run costs depending on the nature of the equilibrium that is played. 
In a cooperative quilibrium the implicit or explicit threat to withdraw 
future cooperation from cheaters deters cheating, and as a consequence, 
cooperation can be sustained by self-interested, rational actors. How- 
ever, in multilateral n-person interactions, which are typical for human 
societies, the prospects for sustaining cooperation in an evolutionary 
equilibrium by individual threats of withdrawing future cooperation 
are quite limited. Boyd and Richerson (1988) have shown that for reason- 
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able group sizes this mechanism for sustaining cooperation does not 
work. 
In this paper we provide strong evidence in favor of another, distinct, 
cooperation-enhancing force that has thus far been largely neglected. We 
call this force strong reciprocity (see also Bowles and Gintis 2001; Gintis 
2000). A person is a strong reciprocator if she is willing to sacrifice 
resources (a) to be kind to those who are being kind (strong positive reci- 
procity) and (b) to punish those who are being unkind (strong negative 
reciprocity). The essential feature of strong reciprocity is a willingness to 
sacrifice resources for rewarding fair and punishing unfair behavior even 
if this is costly and provides neither present nor future material rewards for the 
reciprocator. Whether an action is perceived as fair or unfair depends on 
the distributional consequences of the action relative to a neutral refer- 
ence action (Rabin 1993). We will show that many people exhibit strong 
reciprocity, and their existence greatly improves the prospects for cooper- 
ation. We provide evidence that strong reciprocity can give rise to almost 
maximal cooperation in circumstances in which the standard repeated 
interaction approach predicts no cooperation at all. However, we also 
provide evidence indicating that there are social structures in which the 
interaction between strong reciprocators and purely selfish persons 
induces the majority of people to cheat. This highlights the importance of 
social structures for the achievement of stable cooperation. In addition, 
we show that strong reciprocity is also a powerful norm-enforcement 
device. Therefore, strong reciprocity may help explain the enforcement of
food-sharing norms and norms that prescribe participation in collective 
actions. 
It is important to distinguish strong reciprocity from terms like "recipro- 
cal altruism" and "altruism." An altruistic actor is unconditionally k ind--  
in other words, the kindness of her behavior does not depend on the other 
actor's behavior. A reciprocally altruistic actor, in contrast, conditions her 
behavior on the previous behavior of the other actor. Yet, while a recipro- 
cally altruistic actor is willing to incur short-run costs to help another 
actor, she does this only because she expects long-term net benefits. The 
distinction among strong reciprocity, altruism, and reciprocal altruism can 
most easily be illustrated in the context of a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma 
(PD) that is played exactly once. In a sequential PD, player A first decides 
whether to defect or to cooperate. Then player B observes player A's ac- 
tion, after which she decides to defect or to cooperate. To be specific, let the 
material payoffs for (A,B) be (5,5) if both cooperate, (2,2) if both defect, 
(0,7) if A cooperates and B defects, and (7,0) if A defects and B cooperates. 
If player B is an altruist she never defects even if player A defected. Altru- 
ism, as we define it here, is thus tantamount to unconditional kindness. In 
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contrast, if player B is a strong reciprocator she defects if A defected and 
cooperates if A cooperated because she is willing to sacrifice resources to 
reward a behavior that is perceived as kind. A cooperative act by player A, 
despite the material incentive to cheat, is a prime example of such kind- 
ness. The kindness of a strong reciprocator is thus conditional on the per- 
ceived kindness of the other player. Reciprocal altruism, as it is frequently 
used in evolutionary biology, also differs fundamentally from strong reci- 
procity because a reciprocal altruist only cooperates if there are future re- 
turns from cooperation. Thus a reciprocally altruistic player B will always 
defect in a sequential one-shot PD. Since a reciprocal altruist performs al- 
truistic actions only if the total material returns exceed the total material 
costs, we do not use this term in the rest of the paper. Instead, we use the 
term "selfish" for this motivation. 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND STRONG RECIPROCITY 
The fact that many people retaliate or cooperate when it is costly and pro- 
vides no material rewards raises the question of why people behave in this 
way. We believe that the answer to this question ultimately must be sought 
in the evolutionary conditions of the human species that caused apropen- 
sity for strongly reciprocal behavior among a significant fraction of the 
population. Our evidence suggests that strong reciprocity cannot be ex- 
plained by the motives that are typically invoked by the major prevailing 
evolutionary theories of altruism and cooperation. We will argue that our 
evidence is incompatible with the typical motives invoked by kin selection 
theory (Hamilton 1964), by reciprocal altruism theory (Axelrod and 
Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1971), by the theory of indirect reciprocity (Alexan- 
der 1987; Nowak and Sigmund 1998), and by costly signaling theory (Gin- 
tis et al. 2001; Zahavi and Zahavi 1997). The puzzling question to be solved 
by evolutionary theory is, therefore, how strong reciprocity could survive 
in human evolution. This question is important because as our experi- 
ments show--the presence of strong reciprocators greatly increases and 
stabilizes human cooperation. 
Since our claim that major evolutionary theories of altruism and coop- 
eration cannot readily account for strong reciprocity is quite provocative, 
it is worthwhile to explain exactly what we mean in order to prevent any 
misunderstanding. Our argument is that the observed experimental be- 
haviors cannot be rationalized as adaptive behaviors by these evolution- 
ary models. This means that if one assumes the conditions of the 
experiment (in particular, that strangers interact anonymously with each 
other in one-shot situations), these theories predict hat strongly reciprocal 
behavior cannot prevail in an evolutionary equilibrium. Or put differently, 
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from the viewpoint of these theories the observed experimental behaviors 
and the underlying motives must be classified as maladaptive. In view of 
the robustness and the frequency of strong reciprocity across many differ- 
ent cultures (see, e.g., Henrich et al. 2001) this seems quite unsatisfactory. 
Particularly problematic is the argument hat experimental subjects are 
not capable of distinguishing between repeated interactions and one-shot 
interactions. As a consequence, so the maladaptation story goes, subjects 
tend to inappropriately apply heuristics and habits in experimental one- 
shot interactions (i.e., they take revenge or they reward helping behavior) 
that are only adaptive in a repeated interaction context but not in a one- 
shot context. In the final part of the paper, where we discuss the proximate 
mechanisms behind strong reciprocity, we show that this argument is re- 
futed by the data. The evidence suggests that subjects are well aware of the 
difference between one-shot and repeated interactions because they be- 
have quite differently in these two conditions. 
Recently, Gintis (2000) developed an evolutionary model of strong reci- 
procity. 2His model is based on the plausible idea that in the relevant evo- 
lutionary environment human groups faced extinction threats (wars, 
famines, environmental catastrophes). When groups face such extinction 
threats neither eciprocal altruism nor indirect reciprocity can sustain the 
necessary cooperation that helps the groups to survive the situation be- 
cause the shadow of the future is too weak. Kin-selection also does not 
work here because in most human groups membership isnot restricted to 
relatives but is also open to non-kin members. However, groups with a 
disproportionate number of strong reciprocators are much better able to 
survive these threats. Hence, within-group selection creates evolutionary 
pressures against strong reciprocity because strong reciprocators engage 
in individually costly behaviors that benefit he whole group. In contrast, 
between-group selection favors strong reciprocity because groups with 
disproportionately many strong reciprocators are better able to survive. 
The consequence of these two evolutionary forces is that in equilibrium 
strong reciprocators and purely selfish humans coexist. Another model 
that is capable of explaining punishment in one-shot situations is the cul- 
tural evolutionary model of Henrich and Boyd (2001), which is based on 
the notion of conformist transmission. Henrich and Boyd show that even 
a very small amount of conformist ransmission can stabilize one-shot 
punishments in an evolutionary equilibrium. Multilevel selection theories 
only provide plausible ultimate xplanations ofhuman altruism, however, 
if they are interpreted in terms of cultural evolution rather than genetic 
evolution (Soltis et al. 1995) because cultural variation between groups is 
much bigger than the genetic variation between groups. Multilevel selec- 
tion theories of altruism, such as the one by Sober and Wilson (1998), are 
also compatible with strong reciprocity. 
6 Human Nature, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002 
EVIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF STRONG RECIPROCITY 
The Enforcement of "Nonbinding" Agreements 
In many bilateral one-shot encounters in real life people behave in a re- 
ciprocally fair way. A good example is the exchange between a taxi driver 
and his passenger ina big city (Basu 1984). On the surface this example rep- 
resents atrivial economic exchange. A closer look, however, shows that this 
exchange frequently is similar to a sequentially played one-shot PD be- 
cause the probability of repeated interactions i extremely low and the taxi 
driver first has to decide whether to cooperate (drive) or not. Once the taxi 
driver has provided his service, it would often be quite easy for the pas- 
senger to escape without paying unless the passenger expects that the taxi 
driver will incur the cost of chasing him. Yet for the taxi driver the cost of 
chasing a nonpaying passenger would typically be much higher than the 
return. In these situations a selfish taxi driver will never chase the passen- 
ger Thus, if all taxi drivers were purely selfish, passengers could often es- 
cape without paying the bill. This example shows that even in seemingly 
trivial exchanges the enforcement of the obligation of at least one party is 
often not guaranteed so that the contract is in an important sense incom- 
plete. However, despite the incentive to leave without paying, most pas- 
sengers reciprocate the service by paying the bill. In our view there are two 
major reasons for this: (a) Many people are indeed inclined to exhibit strong 
positive reciprocity, i.e., they pay the bill even if they could escape at low 
cost without paying. (b) Many taxi drivers would be extremely upset if the 
passenger tried to go away without paying and, as a consequence, they 
would be willing to bear considerable costs to catch and punish the cheater. 
Therefore, if potential cheaters anticipate this, most of them are probably 
better off by not cheating. This example indicates how the combined effects 
of strong positive and negative reciprocity contribute to the enforcement of
sequential exchanges that are beneficial for both parties. 
In addition to real world examples, there also is evidence for strong rec- 
iprocity between anonymously interacting trading partners from well- 
controlled laboratory experiments (Berg et al. 1995; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and 
Riedl 1993, 1998). 3In these experiments subjects can earn money accord- 
ing to their decisions and the rules of the experiment. To preserve the one- 
shot character of the experiment subjects were never informed about the 
identity of their exchange partner. Moreover, experimental procedures 
also ensured that no individual subject could ever gain a reputation for 
being, for example, cooperative. Exchange partners were located in differ- 
ent rooms. These features of the experiment ensured that the exchange re- 
ally took place between anonymous strangers. In the following discussion 
we illustrate the regularities of strongly reciprocal behavior on the basis of 
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one of these experiments conducted at the University of Zurich (Fehr, 
Gachter, and Kirchsteiger 1997). 
In the experiment a subject in the role of an employer (or buyer) can 
make a job offer (or contract for one unit of a good) to the group of subjects 
in the role of workers (or sellers). Each worker can potentially accept he 
offer. There are more workers than employers to induce competition 
among the workers. A job offer consists of a bind ing wage offer (or price 
offer: w) and a nonb ind ing  "desired effort level" (or "desired quality level": 
~). If one of the workers accepts an offer (w,~) she has to determine the ac- 
tual effort level, e. In the experiment the choice of an effort level is repre- 
sented by the choice of a number. The higher the chosen number, the 
higher is the effort and the higher are the monetary effort costs borne by 
the worker. The desired and the actual effort levels have to be in the inter- 
val [emin, emax] =~ [0.1, 1] and the wage offer has to be in the interval [0, 100]. 
The higher the e, the larger the material payoff or the employer but also 
the higher the costs, c(e), of providing e for the worker. Material payoffs 
from an exchange are given by l-If = 100e - w for the employer and 1-I w = w 
- c(e) for the worker. A party who does not manage to trade earns zero. 
The effort costs are given in Table 1. Note that since ~ is nonbinding the 
worker can choose any e in the interval [0.1, 1]; that is, she can also choose 
less than ~ without being sanctioned. Since effort costs are strictly increas- 
ing in e, a selfish worker will always choose  = emi, = 0.1. Therefore, a ra- 
tional and selfish employer who believes that there are only selfish 
workers will never offer a wage above w = 1. This employer knows that the 
workers will incur no effort costs and, being selfish, will accept a wage 
offer of w = 1. At w = 1 the trading worker earns FI w = 1, which is more than 
if the worker does not trade. 
In sharp contrast to the predictions based on the selfishness assumption, 
we observe the following regularities: The vast majority of contract offers 
imply, if accepted and met, a much larger profit than 13 w = I for the worker. 
On average the profit implied by the offer, which is defined by w - c(~), is 
35 units. Moreover, the higher the ~, the higher the profit, w - c(~), offered 
to the worker (see Figure 1). This means that employers do not just com- 
pensate the workers for the higher effort costs, they increase the profit of 
the workers if they desire a higher effort level (i.e., they share the increase 
in the total returns that are created by higher effort levels). The employers 
appeal to the strong reciprocity of the workers by being more generous as 
Table 1. Effort Levels and Costs of Effort 
effort(e) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
costs of effort c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
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Figure 1. Relation of desired effort and actual effort to the profit offered to the 
worker. 
the desired effort level becomes more costly to the worker. Workers, in 
turn, exhibit a considerable amount of strong reciprocity (Figure 1). Al- 
though the actual average ffort is below the desired average ffort, it is, 
in general, clearly above emi n. Moreover, there is a strong positive correla- 
tion between the generosity of the offer, in other words, the level of w - 
c(~), and the actual average ffort. 
The results depicted in Figure I indicate that on average the subjects have 
a propensity for strong positive reciprocity. However, the average can be 
somewhat misleading because it hides the presence of purely selfish sub- 
jects. In addition to the studies cited above there are by now also several 
other studies indicating that subjects are heterogeneous with regard to 
their propensity to exhibit strong reciprocity (Abbink et al. 2000; Bolle 
1998; Charness 2000; Fehr and Falk 1999; G/ichter and Falk 2001; McCabe 
et al. 1998, 2000). As in the above experiment, subjects in these studies al- 
ways interact anonymously with each other and reciprocal behavior is 
costly in terms of real money for the reciprocator. Taken together, the frac- 
tion of subjects howing strong positive reciprocity is rarely below 40% 
and sometimes 60% while the fraction of selfish subjects is also often be- 
tween 40% and 60%. Moreover, these frequencies of strong positive reci- 
procity are observed in such diverse countries as Austria, Germany, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Russia, and the U.S. It is also 
worthwhile to stress that strong positive reciprocity is not diminished if the 
monetary stake size is rather high. In the experiments conducted by Fehr and 
Tougareva (1995) in Moscow, subjects earned on average the monetary in- 
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come of ten weeks in an experiment that lasted for two hours. The monthly 
median income of subjects was US $17 whereas in the experiment they 
earned on average US $45. The impact of strong reciprocity also does not 
vanish if the experimental design ensures that the experimenter cannot ob- 
serve individual decisions but only aggregate decisions (Abbink et al. 
2000; Berg et al. 1995; Bolton and Zwick 1995). 
In an extension of the above experiment we examined the impact of giv- 
ing the employers the option of responding reciprocally to the worker's 
choice of e. We achieved this by giving the employer the opportunity to re- 
ward or punish the worker after she observes the actual effort. 4By spend- 
ing one experimental money unit (MU) on reward the employer could 
increase the worker's payoff by 2.5 MU, and by spending 1MU on punish- 
ment the employer could decrease the worker's payoff by 2.5 MU. Em- 
ployers could spend up to 10 MU on punishment or on rewarding their 
worker. The important feature of this design is that if there are only selfish 
employers they will never reward or punish a worker because both re- 
warding and punishing are costly for the employer. Therefore, if there are 
only selfish employers, the workers' decisions hould be the same irre- 
spective of whether or not there is an opportunity for rewarding and pun- 
ishing. However, if a worker expects her employer to be a strong 
reciprocator it is likely she will provide higher effort levels in the presence 
of a reward/punishment opportunity. This is so because strongly recipro- 
cal employers are likely to reward the provision (e = ~) or the overprovi- 
sion (e > ~) of effort and to punish the underprovision (e< ~). This is in fact 
exactly what one observes, on average. If there is underprovision of effort 
employers punish in 68% of the cases and the average investment in pun- 
ishment is 7 MU. If there is overprovision employers reward in 70% of 
these cases and the average investment in rewarding is also 7 MU. If work- 
ers exactly meet the desired effort employers till reward in 41% of the 
cases and the average investment in rewarding is 4.5 MU. 
We also elicited workers' expectations about he reward and punishment 
choices of their employers. Hence, we are able to check whether workers 
anticipate mployers' trong reciprocity. It turns out that in cases of under- 
provision workers expect o be punished 54% of the time and the average 
expected punishment is 4 MU. In case of overprovision they expect o re- 
ceive a reward in 98% of the cases with an expected average investment of 
6.5 MU. As a result of these expectations, workers choose much higher ef- 
fort levels when employers have a reward/punishment opportunity. The 
presence of this opportunity decreases underprovision from 83% to 26% of 
the trades, increases exact provision of ~ from 14% to 36%, and increases 
overprovision from 3% to 38%. The average ffort level is increased from 
e -- 0.37 to e = 0.65 so the gap between desired and actual effort levels almost 
vanishes. An important consequence of this increase in average ffort is that 
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the aggregate monetary payoff increases by 40% even if one takes the 
payoff reductions that result from actual punishments into account. Thus, 
the reward/punishment opportunity considerably increases the total pie 
that becomes available for the trading parties. 
The evidence presented above confirms that strong reciprocity substan- 
tially contributes to the enforcement ofcooperative agreements in bilateral 
sequential exchanges. The power of strong reciprocity derives from the 
fact that it provides incentives for potential cheaters to behave coopera- 
tively or at least to limit their degree of noncooperation. In the above ex- 
periments, for example, even purely selfish employers have an incentive 
to make a cooperative first move (i.e., to make a generous job offer) if they 
expect a sufficient number of workers to behave in a strongly reciprocal 
manner. Similarly, even purely selfish workers have an incentive to pro- 
vide a high level of effort in case of a reward/punishment opportunity if
they expect employers to be strong reciprocators. 
Note that the strongly reciprocal behavior in the previous experiments 
cannot be explained by the major prevailing theories of altruism and co- 
operation. Since subjects know that they are strangers to each other, kin se- 
lection theory does not apply. Since the interaction isone-shot, here are no 
future material rewards from present cooperation or retaliation so that re- 
ciprocal altruism theory does not apply either. Since subjects interact 
anonymously with each other and, hence, can develop no individual rep- 
utation for being cooperative or retaliatory, the theory of indirect reciproc- 
ity does not apply. Finally, anonymity also ensures that cooperation cannot 
be used as a costly signal for unobservable traits--in other words, costly 
signaling theory does not apply either. It is worthwhile to stress that the 
same arguments can be made with regard to the other experiments dis- 
cussed in this paper. Because in these experiments strangers interacted 
with each other just once, and anonymously, the major prevailing evolu- 
tionary theories cannot rationalize the observed experimental behaviors. 
Punishment in Bilateral Bargaining Situations 
There are many real-life examples of the desire to take revenge and to re- 
taliate in response to harmful and unfair acts. One important example is 
that people frequently break off bargaining with opponents that try to 
squeeze them. This can be nicely illustrated by so-called ultimatum bar- 
gaining experiments (Camerer and Thaler 1995; G~ith et al. 1982; Roth 
1995). In the ultimatum game two subjects have to agree on the division of 
a fixed sum of money. Person A, the Proposer, can make exactly one pro- 
posal of how to divide the amount. Then person B, the Responder, can ac- 
cept or reject the proposed ivision. In the case of rejection both receive 
nothing, whereas in the case of acceptance the proposal is implemented. 
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This experiment has yielded robust results indicating that proposals giv- 
ing the Responder less than 20% of the available sum are rejected with a 
very high probability. This shows that Responders do not behave in a self- 
interest-maximizing manner. In general, the motive indicated for the re- 
jection of positive, yet "low," offers is that subjects view them as unfair. As 
in the case of positive reciprocity, strong negative reciprocity is observed 
in a wide variety of cultures, and rather high monetary stakes either do not 
change or have only a minor impact on these experimental results. By now 
there are literally hundreds of studies of one-shot ultimatum games. Re- 
jections of positive offers are observed in Israel, Japan, many European 
countries, Russia, Indonesia, and the U.S. For an early comparison across 
countries ee Roth and colleagues (1991). Cameron's (1999) study with In- 
donesian subjects offered to divide the equivalent of three months' in- 
come. Other studies with relatively high stakes include that of Hoffman, 
McCabe, and Smith (1996), which involved US $100 to be divided by U.S. 
students, and that of Slonim and Roth (1998). 
Multilateral Cooperation and Punishment Opportunities 
The previously discussed studies involve bilateral relations. In view of 
the ubiquity of n-person interactions in human evolution and everyday 
life, however, it is important o know how people behave in n-person sit- 
uations. One question that is particularly important is how the selfish 
types and the strongly reciprocal types affect one another in these situa- 
tions. What are the interaction structures that enable the selfish types to in- 
duce the strong reciprocators to behave noncooperatively, and what are 
the structures that enable the strong reciprocators to force or induce the 
selfish types to behave cooperatively? In view of the fact that strong recip- 
rocators are willing to punish unfair behavior, it seems likely that the pres- 
ence or absence of punishment opportunities i crucial here. To illustrate 
the argument, consider the example of a simultaneously played one-shot PD, 
in which a purely selfish subject is matched with a strong reciprocator. If 
the reciprocal subject knows that she faces a selfish subject, she will defect 
because she knows that the selfish subject will always defect. Consider now 
a slightly different game in which both players have the opportunity to 
punish the other player after they could observe the other player's action. 
Assume further that the punishment is costly for the punisher, which ensures 
that a purely selfish subject will never punish. In contrast, a cooperating 
strong reciprocator iswilling to punish a defecting subject because the de- 
fection is likely to be viewed as very unfair. Therefore, if the selfish subject 
anticipates that a defection will be punished, she has an incentive to coop- 
erate. This suggests that in the presence of punishment opportunities 
strong reciprocators can force the selfish types to cooperate, whereas in the 
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absence of punishment opportunities the selfish types induce the recipro- 
cal types to defect, too. This argument has been generalized and rigorously 
proven by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who show that in an n-person public 
goods game with a heterogeneous population of players, full defection by 
everybody is likely to be the unique equilibrium in the game without pun- 
ishment while full cooperation can be an equilibrium in the game with 
punishment. 
The following public goods game, which is essentially a generalized 
n-person PD, has been used to examine the empirical validity of this con- 
jecture (Fehr and G/ichter 2000, 2002). In a group of four anonymously in- 
teracting subjects each subject is endowed with 20 tokens. Subjects decide 
simultaneously how many tokens to keep for themselves and how many to- 
kens to invest in a common project. For each token that is privately kept a 
subject earns exactly one token. Yet, for each token a subject invests into 
the project each of the four subjects earns 0.4 tokens. Thus, the overall pri- 
vate return for investing one additional token into the project is - 1 + 0.4 = 
-0.6 tokens while the overall social return is -1  + 4(0.4) = +0.6 tokens. 
This means that, irrespective of how much the other three subjects con- 
tribute to the project, it is always better for a subject o keep all tokens pri- 
vately. Therefore, if all subjects are purely selfish they will all keep all their 
tokens privately. Yet, if all fully defect, i.e., keep all their tokens privately, 
each earns only 20 tokens, whereas if all invest their total token endow- 
ment, each subject earns 0.4(80) = 32 tokens. In the no-punishment condition 
the same group of subjects plays this game for ten periods. At the end of 
each period they are informed about the contributions of the other three 
group members. In the punishment condition subjects also play the game for 
ten periods. In addition to their investment decision, they can also assign 
punishment points to each of the other group members at the end of each 
period, after they have been informed about he others' contributions. The 
costs of punishment for the punisher are a convex and increasing function 
of the total number of punishment points assigned to the others. Each sub- 
ject can assign up to ten punishment points to each of the other group 
members. Assigning ten points to another member costs the punisher 30 
tokens; assigning no points costs the punisher nothing; and assigning an 
intermediate amount of punishment points costs an intermediate amount 
of tokens. For each received punishment point the monetary income of the 
punished subject is reduced by 10%. A reduction of 10% implies, on aver- 
age, an income reduction between 2and 3 tokens. The experiment ensures 
that group members cannot race the history of individual investments or 
individual punishments of a particular subject in a group. It is therefore 
impossible to gain an individual reputation for being (non)cooperative or 
for being a punisher. 
Fehr and G/ichter (2000) also conducted punishment and no-punish- 
ment conditions in which the group composition was randomly changed 
Strong Reciprocity and Human Cooperation 13 
in each of the ten periods. In these experiments here is a large group of 24 
people and in each of the ten periods new four-person groups are ran- 
domly formed. When the group composition is random in every period 
the probability of meeting the same group members again in future peri- 
ods is very small. Moreover, even if subjects have already encountered 
some of the group members in one of the previous periods, they have no 
way of identifying the other members in the group. Thus, the random 
group design essentially constitutes a situation in which strangers anony- 
mously interact in a series of one-shot games. 
In the random group design the predictions are quite straightforward if 
all subjects are selfish and are known to be selfish. Since in each period the 
group members essentially play a one-shot game the subjects will never 
punish because punishment is costly for them and yields no future bene- 
fits. While punishment might increase the cooperation of the punished 
subject in future periods, for the punisher the probability of gaining from 
this is very low due to the low probability of meeting the punished group 
member again. Therefore, punishing other subjects makes no sense for a 
selfish individual. Yet, if there is no punishment i also makes no sense for 
a selfish subject o cooperate because any form of cooperation causes a re- 
duction in the material payoff to the cooperating subject. Thus, both in the 
punishment condition as well as in the no-punishment condition of the 
random group design no cooperation should occur if all subjects are 
purely selfish. However, if the selfish subjects expect the presence of 
strong reciprocators in the group (i.e., if they expect o be punished in case 
of free-riding), the selfish types have an incentive to cooperate. Hence, in 
the presence of strong reciprocators we expect quite different cooperation 
levels across the punishment and the no-punishment condition. In partic- 
ular, we expect less cooperation i  the no-punishment design. 
The same predictions hold for the stable group design as for the random 
group design if it is common knowledge that all subjects are rational and selfish 
money-maximizers. In fact, under this assumption, we should observe x- 
actly the same investment behavior in both the punishment and the no- 
punishment condition, namely, no investment at all in all periods. The 
no-investment prediction is most transparent for period ten. Since all sub- 
jects know that the experiment ends in period ten their best private choice 
in the no-punishment condition is to invest nothing. In the punishment con- 
dition their best choice at the punishment stage in period ten is not to pun- 
ish at all because punishment is costly. Yet, since rational egoists anticipate 
that nobody will punish, the presence of the punishment stage does not 
change the behavioral incentives at the investment stage of period ten. 
Therefore, in the punishment condition also nobody will invest in period 
ten. Since rational egoists will anticipate this outcome for period ten, they 
know that their actions in period nine do not affect he decisions in period 
ten. Therefore, punishing in period nine makes no sense for selfish players 
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and, as a consequence, full defection at the investment s age of period nine 
is again their best choice. This backward induction argument can be re- 
peated until period one so that full defection and no punishment is pre- 
dicted to occur for all ten periods of the punishment treatment. The same 
backward induction logic also, of course, predicts defection in all periods 
of the no-punishment treatment, s 
The presence of strong reciprocators will again change the predictions 
substantially because if a subject is punished for free-riding in period t < 
10, he or she knows for sure that the punisher is also part of the group in 
the next period. Hence, the punished subject has a much stronger incen- 
tive to cooperate in the stable group design compared to the random 
group design. As a consequence, cooperation rates should be higher in the 
stable group design compared to the random group design. 
In sharp contrast o the prediction of zero punishment, subjects punish 
very often in both the stable group design and the random group design. 
Figure 2 illustrates the punishment behavior in both designs. It depicts the 
average punishment imposed on a player as a function of the deviation of 
the investment of the punished player from the average investment of the 
other group members. The numbers above the bars denote the relative fre- 
quency of observations that correspond to each bar. The stable group de- 
sign is denoted "Partner" design and the random group design is denoted 
"Stranger" design. Remarkably, the strength of the punishment is almost 
as high in the Stranger design as in the Partner design. For example, if a 
group member invests between 14 and 8 tokens less than the other group 
members, his income is reduced by roughly 55% in the Partner design and 
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Figure 2. Punishment received as a function of the deviation from others' average 
investment (10 partner groups, 18 stranger groups). 
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by 50% in the Stranger design. Moreover, punishment follows a clear pat- 
tern. The large majority of punishments are imposed on the defectors and 
executed by the cooperators. The punishment imposed on a subject in- 
creases the more the subject's contribution falls short of the average con- 
tribution of the other three group members. The positive relation between 
received punishment and the negative deviation from others' contribu- 
tions is highly significant, whereas there is no relation between positive 
deviations and the received punishment. Note that the punishment of 
below-average investments also prevails in period ten. 
What is the impact of this punishment pattern on investment behavior? 
It turns out that contribution rates differ dramatically between the two 
conditions. Figure 3 shows the time trend of average investments in the 
stable group design and Figure 4 shows the trend in the random group de- 
sign. Note that in both designs the same subjects first participated in the 
no-punishment condition and then they participated in the punishment 
condition. Fehr and Gachter (2000) also reversed the order in which sub- 
jects participated in the two designs. The results are almost identical to the 
results shown in Figures 3 and 4. A remarkable feature of Figures 3 and 4 
is that in both designs cooperation breaks down in the no-punishment 
condition. Initially cooperation is relatively high but over time it unravels, 
and in the final period the absolute majority of the subjects invest nothing 
and the rest of the subjects invest very little. This supports our view that 
in the absence of an explicit punishment opportunity the selfish types in- 
duce the reciprocal types to behave noncooperatively, too. Noncoopera- 
tion is the only way in which the reciprocal types can at least implicitly 
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Figure 4. Average investments over time in public good games with random 
groups (18 groups). 
punish the defectors in their groups. However, if the strong reciprocators 
are given the opportunity to target heir punishments directly at the indi- 
vidual defectors, the pattern of cooperation is very different. In both the 
stable and the random group designs, average investments even increase 
over time. In the stable group design the increase in average investments 
is much larger, and eventually almost full cooperation is achieved. 
The very high cooperation i  the punishment conditions represents an 
unambiguous rejection of the standard repeated interaction approach but 
is consistent with the strong reciprocity approach. Moreover, the substan- 
tial difference in cooperation rates across punishment and no-punishment 
conditions indeed suggests that in the presence of punishment opportuni- 
ties the strong reciprocators can force the selfish types to cooperate whereas 
in the absence of such opportunities the selfish types induce the strong re- 
ciprocators to defect. Thus, interaction structures that have theoretically 
identical implications if there are only selfish types generate fundamentally 
different behavioral patterns in the presence of strong reciprocators. 
Strong Reciprocity as a Norm Enforcement Device 
Many small-scale societies are characterized by extensive food sharing. 
A simple game to examine whether food sharing is a social norm that is en- 
forced by social sanctions has been conducted by Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2001a). The game is called "third-party punishment game" and has three 
players. The game between player A and player B is just a dictator game. 
Player A receives an endowment of 100 tokens of which he can transfer 
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any amount o player B, the Recipient. Player B has no endowment and no 
choice to make. Player C has an endowment of50 tokens and observes the 
transfer of player A. After this player C can assign punishment points to 
player A. For each punishment point assigned to player A, player C has 
costs of 1 token and player A has costs of 3 tokens. Since punishment is
costly, a self-interested player C will never punish. However, if there is a 
sharing norm, player C may well punish player A if he gives too little. 
In fact, in the above experiments player A is never punished if he trans- 
fers 50 or more tokens to player B. The less player A transfers (under 50), 
the stronger the punishment he receives. When player A transferred noth- 
ing, he received on average 9 punishment points from player C (i.e., the 
payoff of player A was reduced by 27 tokens). Hence, in this three-person 
game it was still more beneficial, from a selfish point of view, for player A 
to give nothing than to make an equal split. If there is more than one player 
C, and each can punish player A, this may no longer be the case. 
Another interesting question is to what extent cooperation orms are 
sustained through the punishment of free-riders by third parties. We have 
already seen in the public goods experiment with punishment that strik- 
ingly high cooperation rates can be enforced through punishment. In this 
game each investment (i.e., contribution to the public good) increases the 
payoff of each group member by 0.4. Thus, if a group member free-rides 
instead of cooperating she directly reduces the other group members' pay- 
offs. In real life there are, however, many situations in which free-riding 
has a very low, indeed almost imperceptible, impact on the payoff of cer- 
tain other individuals. The question then is whether these individuals will 
nevertheless help enforce asocial norm of cooperation. If they do, society's 
capability of enforcing social norms is greatly magnified because ach 
member of a society acts as a potential "policeman." 
It is relatively easy to construct cooperation games with punishment op- 
portunities for third (unaffected) parties. Fehr and Fischbacher (2001a), for 
example, have conducted PDs in which one player of a two-person PD 
game observes and can punish a member of some other group who also 
played the PD. Thus, each member could punish and could be punished 
by someone outside their own two-person group. Reciprocal punishment 
was not possible in other words, if subject A could punish subject B, sub- 
ject B could not punish A but only some third subject C. The punishment 
by third parties turns out to be surprisingly strong. It is only slightly 
weaker than second-party (within-group) punishment. 
Proximate Mechanisms behind Strong Reciprocity 
Within economics, the leading explanation for the patterns of results de- 
scribed above is that agents have social preferences (or "social utility") 
which take into account he payoffs and perhaps intentions of others. 
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Roughly speaking, social preference theories assume that people have pref- 
erences for how money is allocated (which may depend on whom the other 
player is, or how the allocation came about). From a theoretical viewpoint 
such preferences are not fundamentally different from preferences for food, 
the present versus the future, how close one's house is to work, and so forth. 
In recent years several theories of social preferences have been developed 
(Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2000; Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger 1998; Falk and Fischbacher 1999; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; 
Levine 1998; Rabin 1993). Some of these theories are capable of correctly 
predicting the bulk of the previously described evidence. For example, the 
theories of Falk and Fischbacher (1999) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) pre- 
dict that positive and negative reciprocity help enforce nonbonding agree- 
ments, that negative reciprocity leads to the rejection of very unequal offers 
in the ultimatum game, that free-riders are punished in n-person coopera- 
tion games, and that third parties punish low transfers in the dictator game 
and defection in other groups in the PD. 6 
It is important to stress that social preference theories only capture prox- 
imate mechanisms driving the observed behaviors. They do not aim at 
explaining the ultimate sources of strong reciprocity. Cultural anthropolo- 
gists and evolutionary psychologists have sought o explain the origin of 
strong reciprocity. One idea is that in the environment of evolutionary 
adaptation (EEA) or ancestral past, people mostly engaged in repeated 
games with people they knew. Evolution created specialized cognitive 
heuristics for playing repeated games efficiently. It is well-known in game 
theory that behavior which is optimal for a self-interested actor in a one- 
period game with a stranger--such as defecting or free riding, and ac- 
cepting all ultimatum offers--is not always optimal in repeated games 
with partners. In a repeated ultimatum game, for example, it pays to reject 
offers to build up a reputation for being hard to push around, which leads 
to more generous offers in the future. In the unnatural habitat view, sub- 
jects cannot "turn off" the habitual behavior shaped by repeated-game lif
in the EEA when they play single games with strangers in the lab. 
The unnatural habitat heory assumes the absence of a module or cogni- 
tive heuristic which could have evolved but did not--the capacity to dis- 
tinguish temporary one-shot play from repeated play. If subjects had this 
ability, they would behave appropriately in the one-shot game. In principle 
it is testable whether people have the ability to distinguish temporary one- 
shot play from repeated play. For example, Fehr and G~ichter (2000) show 
that cooperation rates are generally lower in public good games when the 
group composition changes randomly in every period than they are when 
the group composition isconstant across all ten periods. This fact suggests 
that, on average, subjects can distinguish between one-shot and repeated 
interactions because when the group composition changes randomly the 
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probability of meeting the same people again in future periods is much 
lower. However, a fully satisfactory test of subjects' capacity to distinguish 
one-shot from repeated interactions requires that the same subjects partic- 
ipate in both conditions o that we can examine behavioral changes across 
conditions at the individual level. Fehr and Fischbacher (2001b) did this in 
the context of the ultimatum game. 
Fehr and Fischbacher conducted a series of ten ultimatum games under 
two different conditions. In both conditions ubjects played against a dif- 
ferent opponent in each of the ten periods of the game. In each period of 
the baseline condition the Proposers knew nothing about the past behav- 
ior of their current Responders. Thus, the Responders could not build up 
a reputation for being "tough" in this condition. In contrast, in the reputa- 
tion condition the Proposers knew the full history of the behavior of their 
current Responderswin other words, the Responders could build up a 
reputation for being "tough." In the reputation condition a reputation for 
rejecting low offers is, of course, valuable because it increases the likeli- 
hood of receiving high offers from the Proposers in future periods. 
If the Responders understand that there is a pecuniary payoff from re- 
jecting low offers in the reputation condition, one should observe higher 
acceptance thresholds in this condition. This is the prediction of the social 
preferences approach, which assumes that subjects derive utility from 
both their own pecuniary payoff and a fair payoff distribution. If, in con- 
trast, subjects do not understand the logic of reputation formation and 
apply the same habits or cognitive heuristics to both conditions, one 
should observe no systematic differences in Responder behavior across 
conditions. Since the subjects participated inboth conditions, itwas possi- 
ble to observe behavioral changes at the individual level. It turns out that 
the vast majority (slightly more than 80%) of the Responders increase their 
acceptance thresholds in the reputation condition relative to the baseline 
condition. Moreover, not one subject reduces the acceptance threshold in 
the reputation condition relative to the baseline in a statistically significant 
way. 7 This contradicts the hypothesis that subjects do not understand the 
difference between one-shot and repeated play. 
The above experiment informs us about the proximate mechanism that 
drives Responder behavior in the ultimatum game. Whatever the exact 
proximate mechanisms turn out to be, a hypothesis that is based on the 
story that subjects do not really understand the difference between one- 
shot and repeated play seems to be wrong. A plausible alternative hypoth- 
esis is that Responders experience strong emotions when faced with a low 
offer and that these motions trigger the rejections. For modeling purposes, 
behaviorally relevant emotions can be captured by appropriate formula- 
tions of the utility function. This is exactly what theories of social prefer- 
ences do. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The empirical evidence shows that many people have inclinations to 
exhibit strongly reciprocal behavior. Strong reciprocity cannot be ration- 
alized as an adaptive trait by the major prevailing evolutionary theories. 
The typical motives invoked by kin selection theory, by the theories 
of reciprocal altruism and indirect reciprocity, and by costly signaling the- 
ory cannot account for strong reciprocity. However, more recent evolu- 
tionary models like the ones by Gintis (2000), Bowles and Gintis (2001), 
Henrich and Boyd (2001), Sethi and Somananthan (1996, 2001a, 2001b), 
and multilevel selections theories of cultural evolution (Boyd and Ri- 
cherson 1985) provide plausible evolutionary explanations of strong 
reciprocity. 
Strong reciprocity constitutes a powerful constraint for potential 
cheaters that can generate almost universal cooperation in situations in 
which purely selfish behavior would cause a complete breakdown of co- 
operation. Moreover, our results on third-party punishment indicate that 
strong reciprocity is a, or perhaps the, key force in the enforcement of so- 
cial norms. Once the presence of strongly reciprocal actors is taken into ac- 
count, food-sharing and collective action norms are easy to explain. Strong 
reciprocity derives its power to fundamentally affect the aggregate out- 
comes of social interactions from the fact that it often changes the incen- 
tives for the selfish types in the population. In sequential interactions, for 
example, strong reciprocity constitutes an important cooperation incen- 
tive for purely self-interested first-movers. However, as the example of the 
simultaneously played PD shows, there are also interaction structures in 
which the selfish types induce the strongly reciprocal types to behave in a 
very noncooperative manner. This means that it is very important for so- 
cial scientists to examine social interactions according to the objective pos- 
sibilities of the selfish and reciprocal types to affect each other's behavior. 
In general, our experimental results show that the existence of strong re- 
ciprocators greatly improves the prospects for cooperation and norm en- 
forcement. At a methodological level our results indicate that scientists 
who are interested in the evolution and the structure of human behavior 
have much to gain from the application of experimental methods. The re- 
cent successful experiments conducted by Henrich (2000) and others (see 
Henrich et al. 2001) suggest hat the scientific returns from experimenta- 
tion are particularly high in those disciplines (e.g., anthropology) where 
experimentation was absent or rare in the past. 
This paper is part of a research project on strong reciprocity financed by the Net- 
work on Economic Environments and the Evolution of Individual Preferences and 
Social Norms of the MacArthur Foundation. 
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NOTES 
1. There is a large economic literature that tries to provide microfoundations 
for the existence of incomplete contracts. The empirical fact that many agreements 
contain an element of incompleteness is, however, undisputed. A prominent ex- 
ample is, of course, the labor contract. 
2. For different evolutionary models of strong reciprocity see Bowles and Gin- 
tis (2001) and Sethi and Somananthan (1996, 2001a, 2001b). 
3. In all experiments discussed in this paper completely anonymous strangers, 
who never learn the identities of their interaction partners, interact with each other. 
It is also not possible to acquire individual reputations for behaving in particular 
ways in these experiments. 
4. It is important o stress that in the experimental instructions the terms re- 
warding and punishing were never used. The instructions were framed in neutral 
terms to avoid experimenter demand effects. The same holds for other experi- 
ments discussed in this paper. 
5. If rationality and selfishness are not common knowledge, other equilibria 
exist in which there is cooperation and punishment during the early periods. How- 
ever, for the final periods the "no cooperation-no punishment" prediction still 
holds. 
6. A different interpretation is that people obey certain rules--such as, share 
money equally if you haven't earned it (which leads to equal-split offers in the ul- 
timatum game; G~ith 1995). A problem with the rule-based approach is that sub- 
jects do change their behavior in response to changes in payoffs, in predictable 
ways. For example, when the incremental payoff from defecting against a cooper- 
ator in a Prisoner's Dilemma is higher, people defect more often. When players' 
private benefits from the public good are higher, they contribute more. When the 
responder in the ultimatum game can no longer reject an offer, the proposers be- 
have more selfishly on average. Any rule-based account must explain why the 
rules are bent by incentives, and such a theory will probably end up looking like 
a theory of social preferences, which explicitly weighs self-interest against other 
dimensions. 
7. Note that constant acceptance thresholds across conditions are consistent 
with a social preferences approach, whereas a reduction in the acceptance thresh- 
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old in the reputation condition would be inconsistent with this approach. If, for ex- 
ample, a subject rejects every offer below the equal split in the baseline condition, 
then this subject will in general not increase the acceptance threshold in the repu- 
tation condition. 
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